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1.  Introduction
The agreement on export competition constitutes a significant achievement of the Uruguay Round
finalized in Marrakech in 1994.  Under the Uruguay Round Agreement on agriculture (URAA)
export subsidies are capped and subject to annual reduction commitments throughout the
implementation period
1.
Export subsidies amounted to over US$ 27 billion from 1995 to 1998, and the European Union
(EU) accounts for nearly 90 percent of those expenditures.  Of all the provisions of the URAA,
export subsidies were the most binding, forcing many countries to make meaningful change to
their policies to conform to their export subsidy commitments.  Despite the 1992 Mac Sherry
reform and the recent CAP reform program (“Agenda 2000”), the EU may still not be able to live
within its UR commitments on export subsidies in 2000 and beyond (Swinbank, 1999).  Up to
2000, the EU exploited ambiguities in the URAA, which allows some switching between similar
commodities
2.
A new WTO agreement with further cuts to export subsidies will likely result in export market
share losses for the EU in some markets.  During the current WTO round of agricultural
negotiations, many countries including the U.S. and the Cairns Group are calling for outright
elimination of export subsidies. In the absence of new agreement on further cuts in export
subsidies, member countries will face up to the 2003/04 deadlines when the “Peace Clause” and
Special Safeguard provisions will expire.  In the absence of new agreement prior to 2003/04,
countries could other another member country’s export subsidy policies.  This is because the
                                               
1 By 2000, subsidized exports are to reach final expenditure levels and quantity levels at 36% and 21%, respectively
below those of the base period 1986-90. Developing countries were committed only to 14 percent cut in the volume of
export subsidies (23% in value) over a 10-year period.  Least developed countries were exempt from import tariff
reduction commitments.
2 For example the EU exports processed cheese with subsidies under the URAA export subsidy commitments for skim
milk powder and butter as part of their inward processing program, thus bypassing its cheese-specific UR bindings on
export subsidies (Leetmaa and Ackerman, 1999).2
domestic subsidy is defined in the Subsidies Agreement to include any form of price support that
confers a benefit (Swinbank).
Another concern facing member countries is the expiry of the Special Safeguard provisions,
which allows a country to protect high cost dairy and sugar production by restricting imports while
at the same time providing export subsidies to dispose of excess supply. While it is unlikely that
the EU would be persuaded to totally end export subsidies in principle for fear of substantial
market share losses, there might be enough incentives for the EU to reach an agreement by 2003
before the “Peace Clause” and Special Safeguard provisions expire.
The basic economics of export subsidies are well known in the agricultural literature (Abbott,
Paarlberg, Sharples; Bohman, Carter, Dorfman; Chambers and Paarlberg; Haley; Seitzinger and
Paarlberg).  However, in many of these studies the implications from introducing export subsidies
are inconsistent and not always in line with the general result that export subsidies lower the
exporting country’s welfare.  Moreover, many stylized general equilibrium analyses of export
subsidies are based on simplified assumptions not characteristic of commodity markets.  Studies
of the partial equilibrium strand, on the other hand, are more empirically grounded and can bring
more detailed sectoral information.  Nevertheless, these models are limited in the multilateral
context when multiple policy commitments are involved as in the case of WTO agreements.
Any new agreement on export subsidies is likely to be part of broader multilateral reform
package that covers domestic support and import barriers.  Therefore, it is critical to assess the
impact of export subsidy cuts as part of multi-policy multilateral liberalization framework. This
means that the impact of export subsidy removal in the context of other distortions to production
and trade may provide a more realistic assessment of welfare implications for subsidizing
countries, rival exporters, and importing countries in a global context.  Moreover, the interactions3
between different policy instruments may be critical in determining both the magnitude and
direction of changes in trade patterns.
These issues are examined in the present analysis, which offers a quantitative assessment of
multilateral export subsidy reforms using a multi-regional multi-sectoral applied general
equilibrium model.  However, the policy scenarios considered here do not represent any specific
WTO proposal. The objective in this analysis is to ascertain the relative magnitude of the global
trade and welfare effects of export subsidies in relation to domestic and border policies and
determine whether the regional welfare gains from removing export subsidies hold when domestic
support policies and import barriers are also eliminated.
2.  Methodology and Experimental Design
We employ the standard version of applied general equilibrium model known as GTAP (Hertel,
1997)
6 and the latest GTAP database version 5 calibrated to 1997 for production and trade and to
1998 for protection data.  Version 5 has much improved agricultural protection data, including
export subsidies, import tariffs and domestic policies for OECD countries.  Much of the
agricultural protection data is drawn from the Agricultural Market Access Database (AMAD)
7.
Unlike the previous GTAP data base version 4, which allocates all domestic subsidies directly as
output subsidy, version 5 database distribute the domestic support data from the PSE tables into
output subsidies, input subsidies and factor-based (land, capital) subsidies.  In addition, EU
payments are disaggregated separately for wheat, cereal grains, oilseeds and cattle.
                                               
6 GTAP is solved using GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson, 1996)
7 The AMAD database development is a cooperative effort that involves USDA/ERS, Agri-Food Canada, EU
Commission, OECD, UNCTAD and FAO. (for access to the database see the AMAD site: http://www.amad.org.)4
The GTAP database version 5 also has an improved representation of agricultural export
subsidies based on country submissions to the WTO of export subsidy expenditures.  While
country notifications may not be all inclusive
8, the WTO data nevertheless represents the best
available compilation of agricultural export subsidies.   Using 1998 export subsidy expenditures
and the FOB value of exports for 1998 using UNCTAD trade data, effective export subsidy rates
were computed








Where S is the subsidy rate, XR is value of export refund in 1998 $US millions, XT total value of
exports
10, and T is the share of exports that is subsidized.  In order to be consistent across
commodities and regions, a simplifying assumption was to set T to 1 for all commodities and
regions in the model.  The export subsidy rates for 1998, aggregated to the GTAP commodity
classification, are reported in table 1.
The GTAP database distinguishes between 66 regions, 57 commodities and five primary
factors.  In this analysis, The database is aggregated into a 19-region and 19-commodity
aggregation 14 of which are in primary agriculture (table 2).  The regional aggregation include the
major agricultural exporting and importing regions representing both countries from the OECD
(US, EU, Japan, Canada) and the developing world (China, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brazil and
Argentina).
Experimental Design
                                               
8 Examples of cases where policies that confer advantages to exporters but not notified to the WTO include Canada’s
price arrangement for dairy products, the United States’ Food Sales Corporation (FSC), and the EU’s export subsidies
for re-exported sugar from ACP countries and India.
9 In some cases like the US and the EU, export subsidy notifications were taken from 1997 GATT year, in order to
insure a better matching with the 1998 UNCTAD trade data.5
In analyzing the consequences of trade liberalization, the starting point is a projected future state
of the world economy set to 2005 when all the Uruguay Round provisions are assumed to be
fulfilled. In the projected baseline simulation (PROJ_BASE), the GTAP model is shocked with
projections of each region’s endowment of physical capital, skilled and unskilled labor, GDP, and
population.  These are derived from a combination of historical data and World Bank projections
for the growth of population, labor force, real GDP and investment (Anderson, et al.). Since
import trade measures were taken to be constant ad valorem tariffs in the baseline simulation, no
projections for these variables were required for the projection simulation.  For the Multi-Fiber
Arrangement (MFA) quotas, their elimination as part of the Uruguay Round was modeled by
shocking the export tax equivalent of the quotas. The EU-specific shocks from the Agenda 2000
policy include: a) cuts in tariff-equivalents of cuts in intervention prices for coarse grains (20
percent), dairy (15 percent), and bovine meat (30 percent), and b) elimination of wheat export
subsidies during the projections simulation, following the OECD (2000a) forecasts that subsidized
cereal exports would cease under the assumptions that the normally higher domestic prices for
cereals would reach world price levels by 2002 as EU support prices are lowered by Agenda 2000
reforms
11.
The implementation of both the Uruguay Round and Agenda 2000 are expected to affect the
world economy in different ways.  First, these reforms will change the pattern of production and
trade.  Between 1997 and 2005, the percentage change in the relative importance of each sector in
the real GDP of each region changes but the general overall pattern across regions is the relative
decline of farming activities as a consequence of the relatively low-income elasticities of demand
for primary agricultural products.
                                                                                                                                                         
10 excluding intra-European trade in the case of the European Union
11 However, these shocks leave out compensated payments to producers as well as land set-aside adjustments.6
Second, differences in income responsiveness of demand for commodities (Engel effects) will
affect the net export position of a given country and commodity group.  Table 3 reports regional
trade balances, which reflect the combined effect of the production-side and consumption-side
changes.  From the first column related to Australia-NZ region, the first entry shows the difference
in the wheat trade balance in 2005 relative to 1997, in millions of 1997 $US.  At +$US 473
million, this indicates that Australia/NZ is expected to expand its net wheat export position in
2005.  The largest changes in trade balances are in bovine meat (+$US 1526 million) and dairy
(+$US 849 million).  Australasia is also expected to improve its trade balances for food
processing, natural resources and services at the expense of manufacturing sectors whose trade
balances are expected to deteriorate.  India is expected to become a net importer for most
agricultural commodities, outside meats, and manufacturing sectors, but a net exporter of textile
and apparel sectors.  For the USA, trade balances are positive most for food and agricultural
commodities, suggesting that the US will improve its net export position in the post-UR
environment.  In manufacturing sectors, increased trade deficit for textiles and clothing is offset by
increased net exports of other manufacturing.
Table 4 summarizes all model scenarios in this analysis.  Policy experiments are designed as
deviations from projected baseline simulations, following the approach developed by Bach et al.
(2000).  The impacts of global export subsidy removal are examined under three alternative
scenarios each taking as a starting point the equilibrium database generated by PROJ_BASE.  The
first policy scenario, GLOB_X, consists of a global removal of export subsidies for agricultural
commodities by all regions. The results can be interpreted as the changes in selected variables in
the year 2005, due solely to export subsidy removal.   However, this interpretation hinges on the
assumption that internal prices are allowed to fall below support prices, which precludes policy
interventions, such as public stocks or supply controls. The interpretation of the welfare effects7
also hinges on second best effects in the presence of other distortions such as domestic subsidies
and import barriers.
In the second scenario, GLOB_XD, global export subsidies for all regions and domestic farm
subsidies for OECD countries are removed.  The removal of domestic farm subsidies consists of
eliminating output subsidies, input subsidies, and factor-based subsidies, which together form the
PSE calculations for OECD countries. This scenario is designed to highlight the relative
importance of export subsidies within all domestic support policies of which the export subsidies
often constitute an integral part.  The third scenario, GLOB_XDT, extends the previous scenarios
to include the removal of all import barriers as captured in the model in the form of ad valorem
tariff equivalents. The objective is to assess the relative scope of the trade and welfare outcomes
from export subsidy removal in the context of all agricultural support measures.
3  Results
Price and Output Effects
Global removal of export subsidies (scenario GLOB_X) pushes world prices up much more for
sugar (5.6%), dairy (4.3%), and to a lesser extent bovine meat (1.5%) and grains (1.4%) (table 5).
World prices for sugar are highly sensitive to policy changes.  A contributing factor is the EU high
reliance on export subsidies to dispose of sugar surplus, including sugar imported from ACP and
India. Similarly, the higher world price increases for dairy stems from EU dominant position in
export markets (over 75% world share).  Domestic producer prices also increase in all countries
except for the EU whose internal agricultural prices decline, inducing a reallocation of productive
resources from sectors like sugar, dairy, grains and into oilseeds and fiber crops (table 6).
Exporting countries respond to higher world prices by increasing production to offset the EU
export reductions.  The extent and scope of output expansion varies among countries.  For the8
United States, there is modest increase (less than 1 %) for most commodities, notably grain and
sugar.  For other exporters, output expansion in some sectors requires pulling resources away from
other sectors.  For example in Australasia, an increase in dairy and sugar output requires shifting
resources away from fiber and wheat sectors.  For Argentina, an increase in grain production in
response to higher prices requires lower production of oilseeds (table 6, column 3). For net food
importers, higher world food prices stimulate domestic production substituting for pricier imports.
For example in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, domestic output increases in
dairy, grains and meat products, but declines for oilseeds and fiber sectors.
Indirect price effects on production responses via crop-livestock linkages are also at play.
Higher livestock output in many regions outside the EU induce more demand for imported coarse
grain and wheat (expansion effect), hence offsetting the dampening effect on import demand from
higher world prices (substitution effect).  Grain import dependency and the ease of substitution
between imports and domestic substitutes, may largely account for the observed differences in
regional responses.  Results show that the expansion effect is dominated by the substitution effect
as demand for domestically produced feed grains rises while demand for the pricier imported
grains used in the livestock sectors declines (table 7).  For example, in the US, demand for
domestic grain feed used in bovine meat increases by 0.3%, while demand for imported feed grain
decreases by 4.8%.  Similar responses are also shown for other net exporters such as Argentina
and Brazil.  However, despite the increase in livestock production stimulated by higher prices, the
net effect on demand for imported grains is still negative due to higher import prices and
substitution by domestic feed.
The second scenario GLOB_XD combines the multilateral removal of all export subsidies
with removal of domestic subsidies by OECD countries.  In this case, world import prices are
much higher compared to GLOB_X scenario for wheat and oilseeds and slightly higher for sugar,9
dairy and bovine meat.  These price effects also differ among countries.  For the US, domestic
prices increase from 0 percent in fiber to 5.4 percent in wheat.  Likewise for the EU, commodities
that are heavily dependent on exports subsidies such as sugar and dairy show a price decline while
grains which depend more on domestic support show a price rice under the GLOB_XD scenario.
Under this scenario, output response for the US is larger particularly for oilseeds than under
GLOB_X, except for wheat and rice which shows a slight output decline.  The EU shows the same
output responses under scenario GLOB_XD compared to GLOB_X, except for oilseeds whose
outputs drop under GLOB_XD (-4.3%) while it increases under GLOB_X (+ 0.4%).
Under scenario GLOB_XDT, where export subsidies, domestic subsidies and import tariffs are
removed, there is a sharp decline in production as import barriers are dismantled.  The EU also
shows a decline in production in most agricultural sectors except for fiber products.  The U.S., on
the other hand, expands production in most agricultural sectors, except for sugar whose output
shrinks by close to 16 percent.   These downward production adjustments in many countries
following the dismantling of export and domestic subsidies, and import barriers reflect the relative
inefficiencies in current production levels which would be corrected by increased agricultural
exchange under a more liberalized global trading system.
Trade effects
Table 8 reports the change in world trade volume by commodity, as percentage changes.  (They
reflect changes in trade at constant, base period prices.)  Under the multilateral removal of export
subsidies alone (scenario GLOB_X), global agricultural trade decline is induced by higher world
prices and import substitution by domestic products.  The largest decrease in trade volume arises
for sugar (-8.4%) and dairy (-6.0%) two sectors for which the EU has either high rate of export
subsidies (sugar) or substantial export market shares (dairy).10
Changes in gross exports, gross imports, and the net trade balance (which is the difference in
the value of f.o.b. exports and c.i.f. imports) are shown in table 8 and 9 for selected exporters and
importers, respectively.  The EU exports drop significantly, particularly for sugar, grain, dairy and
bovine meats.  Net trade balance is also highly negative for sugar, dairy, bovine meat and grains,
in that order (Table 8).  These large negative trade balances underscore the EU’s reliance on
subsidies to maintain export market shares in key agricultural commodities.
The extent of other exporters’ response to export subsidy removal and the decline of EU
exports varies across countries and commodities.  For the US, exports increase more for non-
bovine meats (3.6%; $US 1512 M), coarse grains (3.1%;  $US 384 M) and bovine meat (2.8%;
$US 102 M).   For US dairy, exports decline by 26% (-$US 383 M) as a result of US removing its
own export subsidies, but the net trade balance is positive since imports are also decreased. The
combination of small US share of world dairy export market, and lower domestic and import
demand result in a small net positive trade balance for dairy under this scenario. Combining all
agricultural sectors, the US shows a net trade balance surplus of over $US 1.6 billion under the
GLOB_X scenario.
Australasia (Australia and New Zealand) captures much of the lost dairy exports by the EU.
This region shows the largest gain in dairy trade under GLOB_X scenario with 23 percent export
increase ($US 1388 M) and a net trade surplus of $US 1162 M in dairy.  For net food importers,
the implications of higher world prices on imports vary among countries depending on the degree
of import dependencies.  For Japan, imports decline for dairy, sugar and meats.  Similar import
decline is also shown for Korea except for sugar. For the MENA region, which is highly import
dependent across a range of products, there is a substantial decline in imports for dairy, sugar,11
bovine meats, showing a net gain in their trade balances
12.   For the experiment GLOB_XD, the
main difference with GLOB_X is the significant decline in world imports of wheat and oilseeds.
The higher increase in world prices for oilseeds results in lower import demand, particularly for
the major import markets such as Japan, Korea, the MENA region and other Asia.  For wheat and
“other grains”, the decline in import demand is particularly large for the MENA region and China.
In the third scenario GLOB_XDT, where all agricultural distortions are removed, world
agricultural trade expands for all products ranging from 5.9 percent for fiber to 73.1 percent for
rice (table 8). These dramatic trade effects show that import barriers have comparatively far
greater impact on world agriculture trade than domestic support and export subsidies. The US
agricultural exports benefit substantially under this scenario particularly for meat products, rice
and dairy where the values of additional exports are largest.  Argentina increases its exports of
wheat, grains, dairy, and meat products at the expense of oilseeds.  Australasia shows a substantial
increase in exports of beef meats and dairy, with no growth in wheat, export in fiber products
decline.  The EU gross exports decline for most products except for wheat and fiber, suggesting
serious erosion of export markets by the EU under a liberalized trade regime.
Welfare and efficiency effects
The cost of trade barriers can be measured in terms of welfare and economic efficiencies. Table 10
reports the welfare results (measured in terms of equivalent variation) for the three liberalization
scenarios under consideration.  Under the GLOB_X scenario, the largest welfare gains accrue to
the EU ($US 2837 M) which eliminates the bulk of the multilateral export subsidies. Exporting
countries such as the United States, Australia-NZ, Argentina and Brazil also show a net welfare
gain.  However, net food importers such as Japan, Mexico, and MENA report a welfare loss.
                                               
12 A net gain in trade balance is relative to the initial trade in the benchmark database.  For example if MENA initial12
Much of the welfare gain by the EU and other net exporters such as the US and Argentina is
due to improved terms of trade, which dominates the smaller losses from allocative efficiencies,
particularly for the US and the EU.  For countries, like Australia, Argentina and Brazil the
allocative efficiency losses are relatively smaller due to lower policy distortions.  For net food
importers, the welfare loss is a result of worsening terms of trade due to higher world prices, and
from increased allocative inefficiency.
A further decomposition of allocative efficiency component reveals further insights into the
mechanisms at work.  The last 5 columns of table 10 show a decomposition of allocative
efficiency by policy instrument, namely: import tariffs, export subsidies/taxes, output
subsidies/taxes, input subsidies/taxes, and other distortions.  From the EU row, we see that the
“export subsidy” component contributes positively to the allocative efficiency by the amount of
$US 1227 M. That is removing export subsidies by themselves is welfare improving for the EU.
However, there are other distortions in the economy, which create second best effects.  For
example, removing export subsidies also affects output, which is subsidized, and therefore
contributes negatively to the resource allocative efficiency.  For the EU, the economy-wide effect
of the “input subsidies” component is positive ($US 54 M) while the “output subsidies”
component is negative ($US –90 M) (table 10).  However, the distortions from import barriers
(tariffs) generate a substantially large welfare loss of $US 1625 M.  As higher world prices further
reduce imports into the EU, this accentuates the welfare loss due to import tariffs.  Taken together,
all of the allocative efficiency components in the EU under the GLOB_X scenario total a $US 192
M loss.  It is noteworthy that for net food importers such as Japan and MENA, the efficiency loss
is largely due to the presence of import tariffs.  As imports are further restrictions as a result of
                                                                                                                                                         
trade balance for wheat is negative $500 M and shows a gain of $200 M in a post-simulation equilibrium, the MENA
region in fact shrink its negative trade balance down to -$300 M.13
higher world prices, these countries shift resources towards more domestic production resulting in
further misallocation of resources and hence loss of efficiency.
Under the scenario GLOB_XD, with the multilateral removal of both export subsidies and
domestic support, welfare gains for the net exporting countries are much larger, particularly for the
US who shows a net welfare increase of $ 1571 M.  On the other hand, welfare losses for net food
importing countries under GLOB_XD are also larger compared to GLOB_X scenario due to larger
world price increased and hence larger terms of trade losses.  Under the GLOB_X scenario, the net
global welfare is negative stemming from larger losses to net food importers compared to the
welfare gains by net exporters.
This overall welfare result underscores the point that export subsidies play relatively a small
role compared to domestic subsidies and import barriers, and that the presence of the latter may
create additional efficiency losses that outweigh the gains from removing export subsidies on the
aggregate.   The negative net global welfare under GLOB_X scenario is not reversed under
GLOB_XD when domestic subsidies are also removed.  This suggests that the large potential
welfare gains from trade liberalization are for a large part contingent on removing the import
barriers which plays a dominant role as trade barriers within the global trading system.  One
implication is that reducing domestic agricultural support by itself may not be beneficial for the
food importing countries, particularly developing countries.  Instead, these countries must also
consider the crucial role of removing import-restricting measures.
This is clearly borne out in the third scenario GLOB_XDT, when all export subsidies,
domestic support, and tariff barriers are removed.  Under this scenario, global welfare increase by
over $US 56395 M, and most countries, including net food importers show a welfare gain (table
10, column 1 lower panel).  The EU’s large welfare gain of $US 14380 M come largely from
improved allocative efficiency, which underscore the importance for the EU of liberalizing its own14
farm policies.  The same can be said of Japan who despite large terms of trade deterioration
showed larger gains from allocative efficiency leading to a net welfare gain. The US welfare gain
of $US 7192 M on the other hand, is mostly from improved terms of trade, which underscore the
importance of open markets for the US exports and the scope for US export expansion under a
liberalized global trade regime.  Among the net food importers, the MENA region shows welfare
gain of $ 2314 M under GLOB_XDT due to larger allocative efficiency gains ($7969 M) that
outweigh terms of trade loss ($US – 5055.5 M).  In the MENA case, this result underscore the
important result that own trade liberalization may be as critical to welfare improvement as reforms
in foreign markets.
3. Conclusions
The objective of this research is to quantify the trade and welfare changes that results from
removing export subsidies and other market-distorting support globally.  The analysis also
examines the underlying economic factors that affect these changes.  While the policy
liberalization scenarios examined in this paper do not reflect any specific proposal to the current
WTO negotiations, these scenarios are designed to estimate the magnitude of costs of existing
policies and by implication the scope for potential benefits from policy reforms.
However before drawing the conclusions of this analysis it is important to emphasize the
limitations of the present study.  The most important point is the representation of policies.  While
we applied the latest and best available sources of tariffs and protection data, our attempt is
obviously incomplete.  In particular we only modeled export subsidies as notified to the WTO and
have not addressed the issue of export credits.  Beside the lack of consensus on what constitutes
export credits, export credit data are difficult to assemble.  A preliminary OECD estimation shows
that the subsidy equivalent of export credits is low (OECD, 1999).  We believe that the overall15
qualitative results of this study would not be significantly altered had we included export credits.
The second limitation is that the types of policies addressed are restricted to those that are
amenable to ad valorem representation and have not included other potentially important trade-
distorting practices.  Moreover, our welfare estimates are based only on a static representation of
the world economy and have not incorporated the potential dynamic effects stemming from
increased investments and therefore higher productivity in agricultural production.
Keeping these qualifications in mind, the present analysis generates a number of important
results.   First, the multilateral removal of export subsidies has differential effects between
countries.  As the largest user of export subsidies, the EU show a substantial welfare gain despite
lower exports and significant adjustments in production among agricultural sectors.  Other net
exporters such as the US, Australia and Argentina, both production and exports expand to offset
reductions in the EU.  For net food importers, the combined effect of higher world prices and
substitution of imports by domestic production results in lower welfare.
The combined multilateral removal of export subsidies and the removal of domestic support by
OECD countries only affects the magnitude of welfare and trade effects compared to those under
removal of export subsidies alone.  Welfare gains by exporters such as the US are much larger
while the welfare losses of net food importers, such as the MENA are also bigger.  Hence despite
welfare gains by the EU and rival exporters, net global welfare following the removal of export
subsidies and domestic subsidies (but not import tariffs), is negative since welfare losses by net
food importers outweigh welfare gains by net exporters.  An important implication is that reducing
domestic agricultural support, including export subsidies by them selves may not be beneficial for
the food importing countries as long as import barriers are also not addressed.
This is clearly born out in the case with the combined multilateral removal of export subsidies,
domestic support and import tariffs.  The removal of all three types of distortions, including16
import tariffs, result in substantial production shifts towards efficient producers and away from
high cost producing regions.  The result is much expanded global trade which increases globally
by $US 122,700 M of which $US 63,367 M for primary agriculture.  Under this scenario, global
welfare also increases by $US 56,395 M with most regions gaining.  For net food importers,
welfare is also positive as the allocative efficiency effects outweigh losses in terms of trade
balances.
Overall, this analysis show that the impacts of export subsidy removal, while significant for
some countries and products, are comparatively smaller and are dominated by the much larger
trade and welfare distortions imposed by import barriers.  Hence, the removal of domestic
subsidies, including export subsidies, by themselves may not be sufficient to improve global
welfare and expand trade since the welfare gains by the net exporters are far outweighed by the
losses of net importers.  The key to improving global welfare and to extending the gains to a
maximum of countries is to address reforms to import barriers.17
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Table 1. Effective export subsidy rate (trade-weighted ratio of export outlays over value of exports)
 (US$ M; 1998)
Sector Columbia Czchek Rep.  EU Hungary Norway Poland
Wheat 0.00 0.00 9.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coarse grains 0.00 0.00 34.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
Vegetables & fruits 2.72 0.00 0.81 2.29 0.00 0.00
Sugar 1.61 0.00 54.41 0.00 0.00 6.21
Dairy 0.00 27.99 24.24 0.00 97.35 0.00
Bovine meats 0.00 65.42 27.14 0.47 32.60 0.00
Non-bovine meats 0.00 0.00 4.16 1.80 56.88 0.00
Slovakia S. Africa Switzerland Turkey USA Venezuela
Wheat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coarse grains 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Vegetables & fruits 0.00 1.04 65.59 0.93 0.00 1.69
Sugar 1.88 2.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.52
Dairy 26.74 0.00 80.12 0.05 18.59 0.00
Bovine meats 45.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Non-bovine meats 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.02 0.00
Source: Authors' calculations from WTO submissions and UN trade data.
Table 2: Model commodity and regional aggregation 
Commodity Aggregation: Regional Aggregation:
1 Wheat Wheat ANZ Australia_NZ
2 grain Coarse grains JPN Japan
3 rice Rice KOR Korea
4 vegfrt Vegetables-fruits IDN Indonesia
5 oilsd Oil seeds MYS Malaysia
6 sugar Sugar TWN Taiwan
7 fiber Plant-based fibers CHN China
8 bovlk Bovine animals RSA Rest of South Asia
9 othlk Non-bovine animals IND India
10 bovmt Bovine meat CAN Canada
11 nbvmt Non-bovine meats USA United States
12 dairy Milk and dairy products MEX Mexico
13 vgoil Vegetables, oil and fat ARG Argentina
14 othag Other agriculture BRA Brazil
15 othfp Other food products RLA Rest of Latin America
16 othps Other primary sectors E_U European Union
17 txtap Textile and clothing CEA Central European Associated
18 mnfct manufacturing MENA Middle East & North Africa
19 srvcs Services ROW Rest of World19
Table 3.  Change in trade balance, by commodity and region, 1997-2005, in millions of 1997 $US.
Australia/NZ Japan Korea India USA Brazil EU15 MENA
Primary agriculture
Wheat 473.0 168.8 -67.6 -104.8 1529.8 -180.1 -819.3 -33.6
Coarse grains -17.3 86.4 -63.0 -5.6 1293.4 9.3 -154.9 -152.0
Rice 40.9 -3.7 19.6 -202.0 242.2 -70.0 -107.1 -113.0
Oilseeds -11.9 187.2 -84.0 -94.0 1161.3 568.2 -614.5 -227.2
Fiber  126.2 17.3 -313.2 -122.8 1536.5 -100.8 234.1 189.8
Vegetables & fruits 143.8 89.1 106.0 -614.1 -137.9 150.2 3287.5 -1069.6
Edible oils, meals -58.2 -74.2 -73.7 -514.9 -67.7 38.9 1814.5 -618.4
Sugar 157.4 41.3 -8.3 -25.4 -186.5 155.5 824.4 -336.1
Dairy 849.5 11.1 1.1 -32.4 125.0 -112.7 751.5 -882.9
Bovine meats 1525.6 -122.8 -85.7 115.2 463.7 153.5 -1258.3 -199.3
Non-bovine meats -38.8 -111.1 48.0 0.2 716.3 179.8 1129.1 -187.5
Other agriculture 119.7 432.2 17.1 -631.6 -1727.0 1388.6 833.5 -515.7
Food processing 2531.0 -38329.0 -2166.1 1870.6 14768.3 -18.9 10062.7 -19796.0
Natural resources 6653.5 -11696.5 -12901.8 -1398.2 -46525.3 523.6 -50028.4 42027.2
Textile/Apparel -1011.7 -9620.4 8678.0 31456.8 -26464.5 -1703.8 -38397.1 -885.8
Other manufacturing -14055.2 -6213.5 9833.8 -11761.0 23898.5 -5907.7 43307.5 -24468.9
Services 5089.7 -28178.6 5002.5 184.5 4449.6 735.1 30751.5 10094.4
Source: authors' simulation results
Table 4.  Model simulations for export subsidy liberalization scenarios 
Initial dataset Initial aggregation from GTAP version 5 
Export subsidy rates are based on 1998 WTO notifications 
Additional tariff adjustments: Changed China tariffs to pre-WTO levels 
PROJ_BASE BASELINE PROJECTION SCENARIO 1997-2005 
Projections shocks: shocks to labor, capital, population and GDP
Abolition of export quota tax equivalents according to the agreement on textiles and clothing
Tariff reductions according to Agreement for non-agriculture and other food products 
(tariff schedules compared with 1995 protection data)
EU-related adjustments (Agenda 2000):
Cuts in import tariffs for coarse grains, dairy and bovine meat corresponding to 20%, 
15% and 30% reduction in intervention price, respectively
Elimination of wheat export subsidies
GLOBAL LIBERALIZATION
GLOB_X Global removal of export subsidies
GLOB_XD Global removal of export subsidies  
+ elimination of domestic support (through value added and interm. Inputs)
GLOB_XDT Global removal of export subsidies  
+ elimination of domestic support (through value added and interm. Inputs)
+ elimnation of import tariffs20
Table 5
Global removal of export subsidies: world and producer price effects
World import Domestic producer price- selected countries
price Australia/NZ USA Argentina EU15 Japan Korea MENA
(%)
Scenario: GLOB_X
Wheat 0.3 0.9 0.4 0.6 -0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4
Coarse grains 1.4 1.1 0.5 1.2 -0.7 0.2 0.4 1.0
Rice 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.5 -0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1
Oilseeds 0.3 0.9 0.4 0.5 -0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4
Fiber  0.2 0.9 0.3 0.5 -0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Edible oils, meals 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4
Sugar 5.6 0.6 0.4 0.6 -0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5
Dairy 4.3 1.1 0.3 0.6 -0.2 1.2 0.5 0.9
Live cattle 0.2 1.1 0.4 0.7 -0.4 0.4 0.2 0.5
Non-cattle animals 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.6 -0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4
Bovine meats 1.5 0.8 0.3 0.6 -0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3
Non-bovine meats 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.6 -0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4
Scenario: GLOB_XD
Wheat 4.7 2.6 5.4 2.2 3.9 2.1 1.7 1.2
Coarse grains 4.1 1.8 3.3 2.4 4.0 2.2 1.0 1.4
Rice 0.9 1.9 1.9 0.9 -0.3 0.7 0.6 0.2
Oilseeds 1.7 1.6 0.5 1.3 5.7 7.5 0.7 0.7
Fiber  0.2 1.3 0.0 1.2 -0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5
Edible oils, meals 0.7 0.9 0.5 1.1 0.9 2.0 0.5 0.7
Sugar 5.8 1.0 0.2 1.2 -0.3 0.4 0.4 0.8
Dairy 4.6 1.5 0.9 1.0 -0.1 1.6 0.6 1.5
Live cattle 2.8 2.0 1.3 1.6 2.8 1.5 0.7 1.0
Non-cattle animals 0.8 1.5 0.5 1.5 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.6
Bovine meats 2.8 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.6 0.7 0.6 0.7
Non-bovine meats 1.5 1.5 0.7 1.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.1
Scenario: GLOB_XDT
Wheat 9.8 12.6 11.2 11.3 1.8 -9.1 6.5 -6.5
Coarse grains 5.8 15.1 6.8 10.7 2.6 -4.4 -29.0 -5.9
Rice 1.2 15.0 5.8 4.6 -6.0 -6.6 -0.9 -3.0
Oilseeds 3.5 10.6 4.1 8.5 4.8 -0.3 -0.7 -8.8
Fiber  -0.1 8.9 2.1 6.7 -2.2 -10.5 -5.0 -4.7
Edible oils, meals 0.4 4.6 1.9 6.6 -0.1 -33.9 -10.2 -9.4
Sugar 5.7 6.0 -2.5 6.4 -3.0 -18.4 -1.9 -5.4
Dairy 6.4 8.9 1.5 4.4 -1.3 -18.6 -5.1 -6.7
Live cattle 3.2 15.4 3.9 12.4 0.6 -17.5 -11.8 -7.0
Non-cattle animals -0.1 9.6 2.3 8.2 -1.4 -5.5 -12.1 -5.8
Bovine meats 4.5 9.6 3.2 10.0 -0.7 -8.5 -9.8 -6.4
Non-bovine meats 0.5 9.7 1.9 6.8 -1.2 -5.5 -6.7 -12.9
Source: authors' simulation results21
Table 6 Global removal of export subsidies: Output responses (percent change) 
Australia/NZ USA Argentina EU15 Japan Korea MENA
Scenario: GLOB_X
Wheat -0.7 0.4 0.1 -0.7 0.9 0.8 0.4
Coarse grains 0.8 0.7 1.8 -4.8 1.1 0.8 2.9
Rice -0.3 0.5 0.2 -4.1 0.1 0.0 0.6
Oilseeds -0.8 0.1 -0.5 0.4 0.6 0.1 -0.3
Fiber  -1.7 0.0 -0.4 1.4 0.2 0.1 -0.3
Edible oils, meals 0.1 0.3 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.5
Sugar 1.8 0.9 0.3 -11.1 0.8 3.9 5.9
Dairy 11.9 0.2 1.0 -1.4 2.3 1.7 4.4
Live cattle 0.6 0.2 0.1 -1.0 0.2 0.1 0.6
Non-cattle animals -1.0 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.4
Bovine meats 1.0 0.2 0.0 -1.5 0.2 0.1 2.2
Non-bovine meats 0.0 0.3 0.1 -0.4 0.3 0.9 1.3
Scenario: GLOB_XD
Wheat 5.8 -0.8 3.2 -0.8 6.4 6.0 2.3
Coarse grains 1.4 1.0 3.3 -5.9 1.4 1.2 3.9
Rice -1.7 -1.0 0.2 -3.2 0.0 -0.1 0.6
Oilseeds 0.9 2.7 -0.4 -4.3 -12.2 -0.2 0.1
Fiber  -2.9 0.6 -0.9 2.4 -0.5 0.2 -0.5
Edible oils, meals 0.1 0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 0.1 -0.3
Sugar 1.6 1.1 0.1 -11.0 0.7 3.9 5.7
Dairy 12.5 0.1 1.0 -1.2 2.2 1.7 4.2
Live cattle 1.4 0.4 0.2 -2.0 0.3 0.2 1.0
Non-cattle animals -1.0 0.7 0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.5
Bovine meats 2.2 0.1 0.1 -2.3 0.2 0.2 2.2
Non-bovine meats 0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.5 0.3 1.1 0.7
Scenario: GLOB_XDT
Wheat 2.9 13.8 9.9 -7.5 -84.5 35.3 -10.9
Coarse grains 16.7 4.5 6.1 -7.2 -20.3 -84.2 -4.9
Rice 93.2 34.7 4.3 -33.5 -26.5 2.5 -1.9
Oilseeds 3.7 7.2 -0.2 -1.5 -43.9 4.7 -10.8
Fiber  -18.9 0.1 -5.8 4.1 53.3 -4.7 6.8
Edible oils, meals -5.0 2.9 1.7 -0.5 21.7 14.0 -3.6
Sugar 5.4 -15.8 -0.3 -30.1 -20.8 22.0 3.9
Dairy 65.8 0.5 4.2 -1.5 -24.3 -2.6 -16.7
Live cattle 22.5 4.6 8.4 -14.7 -14.8 3.7 -11.6
Non-cattle animals -7.6 1.6 -0.2 -0.9 -3.0 8.2 1.0
Bovine meats 40.1 4.2 10.7 -19.5 -6.1 3.7 -17.2
Non-bovine meats 1.6 1.6 0.8 -2.0 -9.3 8.9 -2.5
Source: authors' simulation results22
Table 7
Global removal of export subsidies: Feed demand and substitution effects 
           Grains used as feed for:
dairy  live cattle non-bovine bovine non-bovine Aggregate




Australia/NZ 11.9 0.6 -1.0 1.0 0.0 0.7
United States 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
Argentina 1.0 0.1 0.0 2.0 2.1 0.5
Brazil 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3
European Union -1.4 -1.0 -0.1 -0.8 0.4 -0.7
Imported grains
Australia/NZ 12.3 1.0 -0.7 1.4 0.3 1.0
United States -4.8 -4.8 -4.9 -4.8 -4.8 -4.7
Argentina -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.3
Brazil -1.2 -1.6 -1.5 -1.6 -1.4 -1.4
European Union -2.1 -1.7 -0.8 -1.5 -0.4 -2.1
Source: authors' simulation results
1: Include both intermediate and final demand; 
2: Grains include all cereals except rice and wheat23
Table 8
Multilateral agricultural liberalization: Changes in trade flows for selected expoters
European Union Australia/NZ United States Argentina
World Change  Export Trade Export Trade Export Trade Export Trade
import in global change Balance change Balance change Balance change Balance
price (%) trade (%) (%) ($US M) (%) ($US M) (%) ($US M) (%) ($US M)
Global removal 
of export subsidies
wheat 0.3 -0.1 0.6 67.8 -1.3 -10.0 0.3 36.0 -0.3 4.8
grain 1.4 -1.9 -14.4 -558.8 1.7 6.5 3.1 296.0 3.6 65.6
rice 0.6 -1.0 -7.2 -76.0 -1.2 -1.2 0.7 12.8 0.5 3.5
oilseeds 0.3 -0.2 2.0 72.7 -1.6 -2.1 -0.3 4.5 -1.0 -2.1
fiber 0.2 0.1 1.4 -1.3 -2.0 -12.8 0.0 13.4 -0.8 -0.9
oilseed products 0.2 -0.1 0.3 106.0 -1.0 -3.7 0.1 2.1 -1.1 -26.8
sugar 5.6 -8.4 -45.6 -1357.7 5.0 44.6 6.4 11.3 3.8 3.3
dairy 4.3 -6.0 -6.2 -1160.6 23.0 1162.3 -26.0 61.7 12.7 59.2
Bovine meat 1.5 -2.7 -6.9 -702.2 1.8 154.9 2.8 148.5 0.3 10.3
Non-bovine meants 0.9 -1.0 -2.4 -219.3 -0.1 1.7 3.6 212.7 0.3 1.7
Global removal 
of export subsidies
+ domestic support 
(%) T. Bal (%) T. Bal (%) T. Bal (%) T. Bal
wheat 4.7 -2.0 0.3 58.4 7.7 276.6 -2.7 136.0 6.7 145.0
grain 4.1 -2.2 -16.7 -722.0 6.0 18.3 3.9 593.3 7.1 131.3
rice 0.9 -1.1 -6.1 -67.0 -4.2 -5.9 -3.4 -29.3 0.5 5.1
oilseeds 1.7 1.1 -11.7 -530.1 2.4 6.1 5.2 568.2 5.5 16.4
fiber 0.2 0.7 2.4 3.7 -3.8 -27.1 1.7 75.4 -1.9 -2.3
oilseed products 0.7 -0.2 -0.9 -38.0 -0.5 -3.8 1.6 83.3 -1.4 -15.8
sugar 5.8 -8.5 -45.2 -1338.1 4.6 44.0 7.6 20.2 2.6 2.6
dairy 4.6 -5.6 -5.5 -908.0 24.1 1233.9 -25.3 73.6 12.8 61.3
Bovine meat 2.8 -3.0 -8.4 -906.0 3.9 311.4 2.6 172.0 2.0 33.4
Non-bovine meants 1.5 -1.2 -2.4 -204.0 0.0 4.7 4.2 288.4 0.9 3.6
Global removal 
of export subsidies
+ domestic support 
+ import tariffs
(%) T. Bal (%) T. Bal (%) T. Bal (%) T. Bal
wheat 9.8 21.7 3.2 -927.6 1.2 367.8 25.5 2186.0 21.6 567.4
grain 5.8 11.6 -15.3 -580.6 147.7 424.1 15.9 1825.9 12.0 308.0
rice 1.2 73.1 -37.9 -565.7 232.6 538.8 125.0 1573.8 10.5 55.0
oilseeds 3.5 14.8 0.3 -226.7 16.7 45.4 15.2 1743.3 -11.0 -96.6
fiber -0.1 5.9 4.5 57.1 -23.8 -185.6 1.5 147.8 -14.5 -26.8
oilseed products 0.4 17.8 8.6 170.3 -28.6 -60.7 20.0 520.4 5.0 471.0
sugar 5.7 32.2 -64.9 -4275.9 21.6 225.3 87.9 -1270.4 28.1 13.6
dairy 6.4 25.6 3.2 1831.0 129.1 7050.0 107.9 459.5 66.0 290.8
Bovine meat 4.5 24.6 -43.5 -9866.9 69.8 5075.4 71.6 3205.6 120.8 1313.6
Non-bovine meants 0.5 28.6 -2.9 -1572.6 33.0 99.7 28.4 1441.0 33.4 54.9
Source: authors' simulation results24
Table 9
Multilateral agricultural liberalization: Changes in trade flows for selected importers
World Change 
import in global Japan Korea Mexico MENA
price (%) trade (%) Import Trade Import Trade Import Trade Import Trade
change Balance change Balance change Balance change Balance
(%) ($US M) (%) ($US M) (%) ($US M) (%) ($US M)
Global removal 
of export subsidies
wheat 0.3 -0.1 0.1 -7.8 0.8 -8.3 0.3 -4.9 0.1 -20.8
grain 1.4 -1.9 0.5 -39.0 0.7 -14.1 0.2 -10.4 -5.7 19.9
rice 0.6 -1.0 -0.4 0.9 -0.3 0.1 0.3 -1.1 -1.1 4.1
oilseeds 0.3 -0.2 0.1 -11.9 -0.1 -5.3 0.0 -7.0 0.1 -3.6
fiber 0.2 0.1 0.0 -2.4 0.1 -2.7 0.0 -2.2 -0.1 0.7
oilseed products 0.2 -0.1 0.4 -6.1 0.6 -6.4 0.3 -3.0 -0.1 -16.1
sugar 5.6 -8.4 -1.2 -0.1 3.1 8.1 -2.1 15.8 -24.8 324.3
dairy 4.3 -6.0 -11.2 39.4 -15.7 23.7 -14.3 38.9 -15.8 185.9
Bovine meat 1.5 -2.7 -0.8 6.9 -0.6 0.3 -0.3 -2.2 -14.8 98.0
Non-bovine meants 0.9 -1.0 -0.5 -26.9 -1.9 12.5 0.0 -0.4 -1.8 0.9
Global removal 
of export subsidies
+ domestic support 
wheat 4.7 -2.0 -0.8 -56.2 0.5 -36.9 -3.6 -11.7 -4.0 6.6
grain 4.1 -2.2 0.5 -109.0 0.4 -22.7 3.5 -102.4 -8.2 38.1
rice 0.9 -1.1 -0.7 -1.2 -0.3 0.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.3 3.9
oilseeds 1.7 1.1 -0.5 -50.6 0.0 -8.8 -0.4 -17.3 -0.3 1.7
fiber 0.2 0.7 0.1 -2.4 0.1 -2.0 -0.4 5.6 0.0 -3.7
oilseed products 0.7 -0.2 2.5 -32.6 0.4 -6.5 0.8 -7.9 -0.2 -14.8
sugar 5.8 -8.5 -1.4 0.1 3.1 8.4 -4.0 19.3 -24.7 314.8
dairy 4.6 -5.6 -11.5 37.6 -16.3 25.3 -14.9 37.8 -16.5 188.4
Bovine meat 2.8 -3.0 -1.3 0.9 -1.0 -0.7 -1.3 0.6 -15.6 101.4
Non-bovine meants 1.5 -1.2 -0.7 -42.3 -2.5 16.9 -0.7 3.5 -1.7 -5.4
Global removal 
of export subsidies
+ domestic support 
+ import tariffs
wheat 9.8 21.7 22.2 -446.3 34.8 -334.0 46.1 -184.7 32.7 -1675.0
grain 5.8 11.6 -8.9 121.3 48.2 -615.8 43.6 -792.7 12.1 -493.0
rice 1.2 73.1 1199.7 -4610.4 7.6 86.9 10.6 -28.8 9.6 -89.3
oilseeds 3.5 14.8 19.0 -625.8 6.2 -138.4 -4.6 9.0 23.5 -177.2
fiber -0.1 5.9 0.7 -14.6 -1.5 6.5 1.9 -19.0 5.9 102.7
oilseed products 0.4 17.8 -45.4 610.9 22.0 -148.3 22.8 -134.3 20.6 -420.4
sugar 5.7 32.2 118.9 -483.0 23.5 -46.0 3.9 111.1 -4.6 -58.4
dairy 6.4 25.6 283.4 -3490.0 121.3 -226.1 23.5 -314.8 109.7 -3883.6
Bovine meat 4.5 24.6 34.1 -1292.7 7.4 -15.2 46.2 -481.3 141.2 -1782.8
Non-bovine meants 0.5 28.6 23.6 -1010.1 27.0 92.5 124.0 -916.3 78.7 -71.2
Source: authors' simulation results25
Table 10
Regional welfare effects of removing agricultural distortions  (change in millions of $US per year; 1997 constant prices)
Regional welfare Allocative efficiency components
Total Terms of Allocative  Import Export  Output Input Other
Country/region welfare trade efficiency tariffs subsidies subsidies subsidies
Removal of export subsidies only
European Union 2836.9 3029.2 -192.3 -1625.2 1227.2 -90.0 54.2 241.6
United States 194.0 423.8 -229.8 -157.2 -57.2 -40.9 44.1 -18.6
Australia_NZ 419.3 430.3 -11.0 20.7 -11.2 -33.1 -7.7 20.4
Argentina 241.4 132.5 108.9 6.9 0.1 0.0 0.1 101.8
Brazil 470.8 265.9 204.9 36.1 -18.1 -2.3 113.5 75.7
Canada -335.9 -102.7 -233.2 -121.3 -0.5 -29.6 -56.0 -25.8
Japan -1097.1 -681.4 -415.7 -460.5 -5.1 35.1 48.3 -33.4
Korea -95.1 -87.6 -7.6 -18.4 0.0 32.3 -6.7 -14.7
Mexico -202.7 -136.3 -66.4 -46.9 0.0 -16.4 -1.4 -1.7
Middle East & North Africa -2768.1 -1538.8 -1229.3 -987.1 22.1 -35.0 -40.6 -188.7
Removal of export subsidies & domestic farm subsidies 
European Union 3005.0 2924.2 80.8 -1568.7 1277.7 -83.3 63.6 391.4
United States 1571.5 1855.0 -283.5 -216.8 -109.7 -92.6 64.2 71.4
Australia_NZ 639.2 655.4 -16.3 30.6 -14.5 -44.3 -9.9 21.8
Argentina 502.4 288.8 213.6 16.3 0.1 0.0 -0.2 197.4
Brazil 542.5 349.4 193.2 45.9 -24.8 -3.4 87.0 88.5
Canada -321.9 -242.7 -79.2 -10.3 1.8 100.8 -138.4 -33.1
Japan -1668.6 -1141.0 -527.6 -531.5 -3.9 8.8 53.7 -54.6
Korea -197.3 -168.8 -28.5 -32.0 0.0 23.8 -7.4 -12.9
Mexico -383.3 -314.0 -69.3 -54.6 0.0 -21.8 -1.2 8.3
Middle East & North Africa -3407.5 -1945.1 -1462.5 -1154.7 26.9 -44.0 -61.0 -229.6
Removal of export subsidies, domestic farm subsidies & import tariffs 
European Union 14380.0 984.3 13395.7 8661.9 3813.0 122.9 -485.7 1283.7
United States 7192.2 6413.2 779.0 988.2 -328.8 -544.6 409.7 254.4
Australia_NZ 4767.5 4895.8 -128.4 269.4 -79.6 -295.0 -125.0 101.7
Argentina 2791.2 1633.7 1157.6 104.8 0.3 0.0 -1.0 1053.5
Brazil 3808.6 1648.4 2160.3 310.8 -98.1 -15.3 1180.4 782.5
Canada 1394.9 667.1 727.8 1056.8 1.4 112.7 -534.2 91.1
Japan 8629.8 -3107.1 11736.8 8891.7 176.5 2438.0 -266.1 496.7
Korea 2252.1 -543.9 2796.0 1382.3 0.0 1367.0 125.3 -78.5
Mexico -563.8 -1323.2 759.3 636.8 0.0 83.3 9.3 29.8
Middle East & North Africa 2313.2 -5055.5 7368.7 6151.3 -13.5 183.3 515.5 532.0
Source: authors' simulation results